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COURT-APPOINTED FIDUCIARIES:
NEW YORK'S EFFORTS TO REFORM A
WIDELY-CRITICIZED PROCESS
LAWRENCE K. MARKSt
INTRODUCTION

The New York courts have a long tradition of appointing
private individuals, usually lawyers, to assist them in various
capacities. In mortgage foreclosure actions, a receiver may be
appointed to manage the property while the foreclosure litigation
is pending, and a referee may be appointed to sell the property
once the foreclosure is consummated.
In guardianship
proceedings, a court evaluator may be appointed to recommend
whether a guardian is needed for an alleged incapacitated
person, and if so, then a guardian will be appointed to manage
the personal and financial affairs of the ward. In estate cases, a
guardian ad litem may be appointed to assist the court in
determining how best to protect the interests of a child affected
by the litigation.
These are some of the more common examples of what are
known as "fiduciary" appointments.' One of the distinguishing
features of these appointments is that the appointees are
privately paid. Unlike private attorneys appointed by courts to
represent, for example, indigent litigants in criminal and family
t Special Counsel to the Chief Administrative Judge, New York State Unified
Court System. B.A., 1979, State University of New York at Albany; J.D., 1982,
Cornell Law School. The author served as Counsel to the New York Chief Judge's
Commission on Fiduciary Appointments and participated in the development of
New York's new fiduciary appointment rules. Any opinions or conclusions expressed
in this Article are exclusively those of the author.
1 A "fiduciary" is often regarded as one who protects the pecuniary interests of
another. The dictionary definition, however, is broader. See, e.g., MERRIAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 433 (10th ed. 1993) (defining "fiduciary" as "of,
relating to, or involving a confidence or trust"). Indeed, in New York, fiduciary
appointments can encompass situations more akin to traditional attorney-client
relationships, such as attorneys for alleged incapacitated persons and law guardians
in matrimonial cases. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.1 (2003).
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matters, a fiduciary appointee's fees are not paid by the
government. 2 Rather, the fiduciary's fees and costs are paid by
the litigants themselves, and in some cases, the amounts can be
quite substantial.
In light of the money-making potential of these
appointments, they have long been the subject of close public
scrutiny. This scrutiny, in turn, has led to widespread criticism
that judges' fiduciary appointments are influenced by
inappropriate factors such as political favoritism and personal
connections, particularly in cases involving substantial fees.
Some of the strongest criticism surfaced in early 2000 following
the release of a letter written by two politically-connected
lawyers to political party officials complaining that despite the
lawyers' long and unswerving service to the party, they were not
receiving their fair share of fiduciary appointments.
In the wake of the harsh public reaction to this letter and in
an effort to preserve public trust and confidence in the courts,
New York Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye took a series of
unprecedented steps. Of particular note was the creation of a
new office within the court system to investigate allegations of
ethical violations and other misconduct arising out of fiduciary
appointments. Chief Judge Kaye also appointed a commission,
composed of high-level representatives of the bench and bar, to
conduct a sweeping evaluation of New York's fiduciary
appointment process and to make recommendations for reform.
The report of the Chief Judge's Commission on Fiduciary
Appointments (the "Commission"), released in December 2001,
confirmed many of the criticisms of the process that had been
made over the years. The report proposed sweeping changes in
the process, including new standards governing eligibility and
qualifications for appointment as a fiduciary in New York,
revised appointment procedures, and improved oversight
measures. The Commission's recommendations resulted in the
recent promulgation by the Chief Judge of a comprehensive set
of stringent new fiduciary appointment rules, making New
York's fiduciary appointment process the most closely regulated
of any in the nation.
2 See, e.g., N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1991) (prescribing that costs of
legal representation of indigent criminal defendants and indigent adult family court
litigants are borne by the counties).
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This Article examines the new rules and explains the
context in which they were developed. Part I outlines the types
of fiduciary appointments that are made in New York and prior
efforts to regulate the appointment process. Part II discusses
the criticisms of the fiduciary appointment process that have
been leveled in recent years and the recommendations for reform
that the Commission offered in response to those criticisms.
Part III analyzes the new rules that emerged from the Fiduciary
Commission's recommendations. Part III also explores further
measures that might be considered if problems in New York's
fiduciary appointment process persist.
I.

A.

FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENTS IN NEW YORK

Types of FiduciaryAppointments

In New York, judges appoint fiduciaries in a wide range of
cases. Some of these appointments are made to assist the court
in its adjudicative responsibilities; some are made to protect the
interests of litigants or others affected by the litigation; and
some, if not most, are made in furtherance of a combination of
these and other purposes.
1.

Article 81 Fiduciaries

A particularly fertile area of fiduciary appointments is
guardianship, or Article 81, cases. 3 Under Article 81 of the New
3 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.01-.44 (McKinney 1996). Enacted in 1992,
Article 81 replaced the existing system of conservatorships and committees-former
N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law articles 77 and 78-that was used to appoint a surrogate
decision-maker for persons unable to make decisions for themselves. In addition to
creating a new range of fiduciaries to assist the court and the incapacitated person,
Article 81 was designed to shift the focus from the underlying cause of the
individual's incapacity to how the incapacitated person could best carry out the
daily activities of living. See Rose Mary Bailly, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Mental
Hyg. Law § 81.01, at 248 (McKinney 1996). The article's legislative findings and
purpose section states, in relevant part:
The legislature finds that it is desirable for and beneficial to persons with
incapacities to make available to them the least restrictive form of
intervention which assists them in meeting their needs but, at the same
time, permits them to exercise the independence and self-determination of
which they are capable. The legislature declares that it is the purpose of
this act to promote the public welfare by establishing a guardianship
system which is appropriate to satisfy either personal or property
management needs of an incapacitated person in a manner tailored to the
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York Mental Hygiene Law, a court may appoint a guardian to
provide for the personal care of an incapacitated person or to
manage the property and financial affairs of the incapacitated
person or both. 4 An Article 81 proceeding is commenced by the
filing of a petition in New York's court of general jurisdiction, the
New York Supreme Court. 5 The court then appoints a court
evaluator who must conduct an investigation and submit a
report with detailed recommendations to the court addressing,
among other things, whether the alleged incapacitated person
(AIP) is in fact incapacitated, whether adequate and reliable
resources are available as an alternative to the appointment of a
guardian, and what authority should be exercised by a guardian
if one is ultimately appointed. 6 The court evaluator may be an
attorney, physician, psychologist, accountant, social worker,
nurse, or any other qualified person;7 in practice, the courts
usually appoint attorneys.
AIPs have the right to be represented in the proceedings by
counsel of their choice. 8 If the AIP is not represented, the court
must appoint counsel in a variety of situations, such as when the
AIP requests counsel, the AIP seeks to contest the petition, or
the court determines that appointment of counsel would be
helpful. 9
individual needs of that person, which takes in account the personal
wishes, preferences and desires of the person, and which affords the person

the

greatest

amount

of independence

and self-determination

and

participation in all the decisions affecting such person's life.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 1996).
4 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(a) (McKinney 1996). Surrogate's Courts
may appoint a guardian for an infant, N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT §§ 1701-27
(McKinney 1996), or for a mentally retarded person or a developmentally disabled
person, id. §§ 1750-61.
5 Although Mental Hygiene Law § 81.04(a) authorizes filing in a county court

as well, as a practical matter, guardianship proceedings in New York are handled in
supreme court. Mental Hygiene Law § 81.06 specifies who may bring the petition.
6 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.09(5) (McKinney 1996). Appointment of a court

evaluator is mandatory, although if the court appoints an attorney for the AIP, it
may forgo appointment of the court evaluator. See id. § 81.10(g).
7 See id. § 81.09(b)(1). If the AIP is a patient in an institution such as a hospital
or a nursing home, the institution or the Mental Hygiene Legal Service may be
appointed as the court evaluator. See id. § 81.09(b)(2). The courts also have
increasingly been appointing Mental Hygiene Legal Service as court evaluator

where the AIP has minimal or no assets.
8 See id. § 81.10(a).
9 See id. § 81.10(c).
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Following a hearing, if the court concludes that the AIP is in
fact incapacitated and that appointment of a guardian is
necessary, the court may appoint a guardian. 10 In selecting the
guardian, the courts generally give preference to a person
nominated by the incapacitated person or to a family member."
If no such person is available for appointment, the court must
appoint some other "suitable" person;12 again, the usual practice
is to appoint an attorney. If the incapacitated person is indigent,
the court may appoint a non-profit organization or social service
13
agency as guardian.
In the course of providing for the personal care or managing
the property and finances of the incapacitated person, the
guardian must file with the court regular financial accountings
as well as periodic reports that address the incapacitated
person's condition and care. 14 The court appoints a court
examiner to review these reports and provide the court with his
or her own report assessing the accounting and report filed by
the guardian. 15 The court examiners are also usually attorneys.
In general, Article 81 fiduciaries are paid from the assets of
the incapacitated person. Court evaluators and attorneys for
AIPs usually are paid hourly fees based on the fair and
reasonable value of their services. 16 Court examiners are paid
set fees prescribed in schedules promulgated by the appellate
division, which are based on the amount of the incapacitated
10 See id. § 81.16(c). The guardian's powers must be limited to those the court
has found "necessary to assist the incapacitated person in providing for personal
needs and/or property management." Id. § 81.16(c)(2).
11 See id. § 81.17 (allowing the AIP to nominate a guardian); Rose Mary Bailly,
Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 81.19, at 360 (McKinney 1996).
12 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.19(a)(1) (McKinney 1996). The statute provides
that "talny individual over eighteen years of age... who is found by the court to be
suitable to exercise the powers necessary to assist the incapacitated person may be
appointed as guardian." Id.
13 See id. § 81.19(2); see also N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 473-d (McKinney 1992)

(authorizing "[clommunity guardian" programs).
14 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw §§ 81.30-.31 (McKinney 1996).
15 See id. § 81.32.
16 See Rose Mary Bailly, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law
§ 81.09, at 307-08 (McKinney 1996); see also In re Potts, 213 A.D. 59, 62, 209 N.Y.S.
655, 657 (4th Dep't 1925), af/'d 241 N.Y. 593, 150 N.E. 568, 241 N.Y.S. 593 (1925)

(stating that in determining reasonableness of an attorney's claim for services, court
should consider nature of services rendered, difficulty of case, time spent, amounts
involved, results obtained, and the professional standing of the attorney).
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person's assets.
Guardians are paid in accordance with
individual compensation plans that the court establishes; 17 the
compensation plan may be based on a percentage of the
incapacitated person's assets, a percentage of the amounts the
guardian receives and disburses, an hourly fee, or some
8
combination of these methods.'
2.

Receivers

In cases involving disputes over property, the risk may arise
that the property will be materially injured or destroyed before
resolution of the dispute. To protect against this, the party with
an interest in the property may petition the court for
appointment of a receiver to manage the property while the
litigation is pending. 19
Receivers are authorized to take
possession of real and personal property and to sue for, collect,
and sell debts or claims. 20 For example, in what is by far the
most common type of case in which receivers are appointed-a
mortgage foreclosure proceeding-the receiver is authorized to
collect rents and initiate or defend against lawsuits involving
collection of the rent or the eviction of tenants.
Receivers are paid from the assets of the property in
receivership. The fee, or commission, is based on the total sums
that the receiver collects and disburses during the pendency of
the receivership and may not exceed five percent of such
21
amounts.

See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.28(a) (McKinney 1996).
Mental Hygiene Law § 81.28(a) makes explicit reference to methods for
compensating fiduciaries under the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act. Id.; see also
N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 2307 (McKinney 1997) (calculating commissions for
fiduciaries other than trustees based on amount received and disbursed); see id.
§ 2309 (calculating commissions for trustees based on principal amount of trust).
19 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6401(a) (McKinney 1980). Technically, the statute labels
the appointee a "temporary" receiver because the receivership may not continue
after final judgment unless the court directs otherwise. See id. § 6401(c).
20 See id. § 6401(b).
21 See id. § 8004(a) (McKinney 1981). In cases in which a receiver's fee, based
on the five percent formula, would be less than one hundred dollars, the court may
direct a fee of up to one hundred dollars for the services rendered. Id. In cases in
which no funds exist at the termination of the receivership, the court may direct
that the party who sought appointment of the receiver pay the receiver's fee. Id. §
8004(b).
17
18
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Referees

Under New York law, courts may appoint referees to
perform a range of functions on their behalf.22 A primary
purpose for which courts use referees is to sell property that has
been subject to a foreclosure judgment. 23 The referee computes
the value of the property and then sells it at a public auction
that is usually held at the courthouse. The referee's fees, which
are paid from the proceeds of the sale, are generally fifty dollars
to compute the value of the property and five hundred dollars to
24
sell the property.
4.

Guardians ad Litem

Courts appoint guardians ad litem to protect the interests of
individuals not capable of protecting themselves. Generally,
25
guardians ad litem are appointed in surrogate's court cases.
Appointment of a guardian ad litem typically arises when an
unrepresented person under a disability is a necessary party to a
proceeding and is incapable of adequately protecting his or her
own rights. 26
Persons under a disability include infants,
incapacitated and incompetent individuals, prisoners, unborns,
and unknowns. 27
22 See generally id. § 4301 (McKinney 1992) ("A referee to determine an issue or
to perform an act shall have all the powers of a court in performing a like
function .... ").
23 See id. § 5103(b) (McKinney 1997) (mandating that property sold by court
order be sold in the manner directed by the judgment of the court); N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTS § 1351(1) (McKinney 1979) (allowing for judicial sale of property by referees).
24 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8003 (McKinney 1981). If the value of the property is high,
the court may designate a greater fee to sell the property. Id. § 8003(b).
25 Guardians ad litem are appointed on occasion in other types of cases as well,
such as matrimonial cases in supreme court.
26 See, e.g., In re Estate of O'Connor, 72 Misc. 2d 490, 491, 339 N.Y.S.2d 726,
727-28 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1973) (holding that the court was obliged to appoint a
guardian ad litem for an infant who was a necessary party to estate litigation). An
infant over the age of fourteen may petition the court to appoint a named attorney
as his or her guardian. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 403(1) (McKinney 1994).
27 See In re Rosner, 144 A.D.2d 148, 149, 534 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (3d Dep't 1988)
(holding, in the alternative, that a person unable to understand proceedings was
disabled within the meaning of SCPA 403(2)); Estate of Winston, 92 Misc. 2d 208,
209, 399 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1000 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1977) (finding an individual
incapable of protecting her legal rights disabled); Estate of Robles, 72 Misc. 2d 554,
557, 339 N.Y.S.2d 171, 174 (Sur. Ct. Orange County 1972) (noting that since an
individual was in a penal institution, he was incapacitated, and, therefore, a
guardian ad litem was necessary).
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A guardian ad litem must be an attorney.2 8
Upon
appointment, the guardian ad litem undertakes an investigation
of the facts and reviews all operative documents and other
relevant materials, such as the will, trust, tax return, and other
financial documents to determine whether there has been
compliance with applicable laws and procedures.
After
completing the investigation and review, the guardian ad litem
files a report with the court recommending whether objections
should be made or other proceedings should be conducted to
29
protect the interests of the ward.
In most cases, the guardian ad litem's fee is paid out of the
estate. 30 The fee must be a reasonable one based on "the nature
and extent of the services, the time spent [on the case,] the
stature and experience of the lawyer, the complexity of the
31
issues, and the results achieved."
5.

Secondary Fiduciaries

In proceedings in which fiduciaries are appointed, secondary
fiduciaries may be appointed or retained by the primary
fiduciaries to perform various services and functions.
In
receivership cases, for example, counsel and property managers
are often employed to assist the receiver with legal matters and
32
day-to-day management of the property under receivership.
Article 81 guardians often retain counsel as well as accountants
and other financial professionals to assist in their
responsibilities. Guardians ad litem may also retain other
professionals to assist them.

28 See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 404(1) (McKinney 1994).

29 The guardian ad litem must report to the court what he or she believes to be
in the ward's best interests, regardless of whether that is consistent with the ward's

wishes. Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 247, 347 N.E.2d 647, 650-51, 383 N.Y.S.2d
285, 288 (1976). Thus, the guardian ad litem's role differs from that of an attorney,
who must advance his or her client's wishes even if, in the attorney's view, they may
not be in the client's best interests.

30 The court, however, may direct that the fee be paid from the assets of the
person under disability or, for good cause shown, by another party to the
proceedings. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 405(1) (McKinney 1994).

31 Margaret V. Turano, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 405,
at 391 (McKinney 1994).
32 See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6401(b) (McKinney 1980) (recognizing a
receiver's authority to employ counsel, although only upon express authorization by
the court).
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Secondary fiduciaries are generally paid hourly fees for their
work, and in some cases their fees can be lucrative. 33 Indeed, in
receivership cases, the counsel's compensation can exceed the
34
receiver's compensation.
B.

Regulation of the FiduciaryAppointment Process and Part
36 of the Rules of the ChiefJudge

Public criticism of fiduciary appointments in the New York
courts has been widespread and long-standing. Discussed in
greater detail in Part II, such criticism has centered on
allegations that judges do not always select fiduciaries based on
merit, but rather on politics, nepotism, and other factors
unrelated to the objective qualifications of the appointees,
particularly in cases involving large fees. An early example of
the problem involves Albert Cardozo, Benjamin Cardozo's father
and a Manhattan supreme court justice in the second half of the
nineteenth century. In large part because of public outrage over
his repeated appointment of relatives and political cronies as
fiduciaries, Albert Cardozo was forced to resign his judgeship in
35
disgrace.
Continuing criticism in the century following Albert
Cardozo's resignation eventually led to a series of efforts to
improve the appointment process or, at the least, make it subject
to greater scrutiny. The first step was taken in 1967 with the
state legislature's enactment of section 35-a of the New York
Judiciary Law. In its original form, section 35-a mandated that
all court appointees, other than those compensated with public
funds, file with the New York State Office of Court
Administration a notice of appointment at the time of
appointment and a statement of award of compensation at the
time of payment.
Governor Rockefeller's approval message
explained that the purpose of the law was to "bolster public
confidence in the disposition of court appointments" by ensuring
that information about the compensation of court appointees is

33 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENTS, at 12 (Dec.

2001) [hereinafter COMMISSION] (noting the potentially lucrative nature of
secondary appointments), availableat http://www.courts.state.ny.us/fiduciaryreport/
fidcommreport.htm#anchor15472.
34 See id.
35 See ANDREW KAUFMAN, CARDOZO, 16-19 (1998).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.77:29

made available to the public. 36 After several years of experience
with this requirement, it became apparent that a significant
number of appointees were failing to make the required filings.
Thus, the law was amended in 1975 to eliminate the
requirement that the appointee file the forms. Instead, it now
requires that the judge make a single filing of the compensation
awarded.37 It was assumed that imposing the filing requirement
on the judge would be a more reliable means of ensuring that
filings would be made.
In the 1970s, the fiduciary appointment process again came
under public scrutiny as a result of charges that certain supreme
court judges in New York City were appointing close relatives of
other supreme court judges. In response, the Appellate Division,
First Department, promulgated a strict new appointment
procedure for the counties within its jurisdiction-New York and
Bronx counties. The procedure provided that the judge presiding
over the case in which a fiduciary was to be appointed would not
select the appointee; instead, another judge of the court,
determined on a rotational basis, would make the selection. 38
At about the same time, the First Department appointed a
committee to study the fiduciary appointment process and make
recommendations for improvement. Issuing its report in 1980,
the committee concluded that the rotational selection process
that the First Department had implemented was unduly
cumbersome and that it was preferable that the judge handling
the case select the fiduciary appointee. 39 The committee,
however, recommended that relatives of judges be ineligible for
appointment and that former judges be ineligible for two years
36 Governor's Approval Memorandum, ch. 625, N.Y. Laws (Apr. 27, 1967),
reprinted in 1967 N.Y. Laws 1535 (McKinney). The statute applied to a broad
category of appointments, including appointments not traditionally falling within
the category of "fiduciary" appointments: i.e., "all court appointees, including all
persons appointed as appraisers, special guardians, guardians ad litem, general
guardians, referees, counsels, special referees, committees of incompetents, [or]
receivers." Id. The only appointments excluded from the requirements of the statute
were, in general, those in which the appointees were compensated from public
funds.
37 1975 N.Y. Laws 834, § 1. This requirement was promulgated as well in Part
26 of the Rules of the Chief Judge. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 26
(1975).
38 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 660.24 (1977).

39 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS, at 21-22 (1980) (on

file with author).
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after leaving the bench.40 The committee further proposed that
individual appointees be eligible for only one "substantial"
appointment within a twelve-month period. 4 1 The committee's
recommendations were referred to the Administrative Board of
the Courts. 42 Following opposition from the New York State
Judicial Conference and the New York State Association of
Supreme Court Justices, the Administrative Board rejected the
rules, and they were never referred to the Court of Appeals for
43
approval.
Several years later, following renewed charges of favoritism
in the appointment process, a set of fiduciary appointment rules
was drafted, circulated for public comment, and submitted to
and approved by the Court of Appeals. The new rules, Part 36 of
44
the Rules of the Chief Judge, took effect on April 1, 1986.
In its original form, Part 36 governed "appointments of
guardians, guardians ad litem, conservators, committees for the
incompetent, receivers, and persons designated to perform
services for a receiver." 45 Notably, the rules placed the authority
for selecting the appointee with the judge presiding over the
case.
Although the rules required the creation of lists of
candidates for appointment, no minimum qualifications were
established for placement on the lists. Rather, the appointing
judge was required to determine the appointee's qualifications
for appointment, and the rules provided that the judge need not
even use the lists so long as he or she set forth on the record the
46
reasons for not doing so.

Id. at 16-18.
Id. at 23.
42 The Administrative Board of the Courts, consisting of the Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals and the Presiding Justice of each of the four appellate
departments, has a broad consultative role in the establishment of standards and
administrative policies for the New York State Unified Court System. N.Y. JUD.
LAW § 211(1) (McKinney 1983).
43 See COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 14-15.
44 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36 (1986).
45 Id.
§ 36.1(a). The rules thus applied to a narrower category of appointees
than those governed by Jud. Law § 35-a. See supra note 36. It was thought that the
appointments specified in the rules were the "most common and the most
remunerative, and that it would be impractical to apply the new oversight
procedures to additional categories of appointments." COMMISSION, supra note 33,
at 15.
46 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.1(a) (1986).
40

41
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Several
of
the
First
Department
committee's
recommendations found their way into the new rules. The rules
rendered ineligible for appointment any relative of any judge of
the New York State Unified Court System, whether by blood or
marriage. 47 In addition, the rules limited the number of higher
compensation appointments that an individual appointee could
receive. No appointee could receive more than one appointment
within any twelve-month period for which the compensation was
anticipated to be more than $5000, except in unusual
circumstances involving continuity of representation or
48
familiarity with the case.
The rules also required appointees to make two separate
filings. The appointee was required to file a certification of
compliance verifying that the appointment would not be in
violation of the rules 49 and specifying all appointments received
within the previous twelve months. 50 Once the appointment was
made, the appointee also had to file a notice of appointment with
the Office of Court Administration. 5 1 Under the rules, the notice
of appointment was a public record, and the Chief Administrator
of the Courts was required to arrange for the periodic publication
52
of the names of the persons appointed.
47 Id. § 36.1(b)(1). The original version of the rule disqualified all relatives of
judges, no matter how far the relative was down the judge's family tree or
geographically removed from the appointing judge's court. The rule was moderated
somewhat in 1996, to prohibit appointment of relatives of judges within the sixth
degree of relationship (which extends to second cousins).
48 Id. § 36.1(c).
49 Essentially, this meant that the appointee was not related to a judge, and the
appointment would not violate the $5000 rule.
50 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.1(d) (1986).
51 See id. § 36.3(a).
52 See id. Following its promulgation in 1986, Part 36 was amended in several
respects. In addition to the loosening of the prohibition against appointing relatives
of judges, see supra note 47, the rules were amended to prohibit judicial hearing
officers from receiving appointments in a court of a county in which they served on
the judicial hearing officer panel, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.1(b)(2)
(1989). Part 36 was also amended to require that notice of appointment be filed no
later than the first business day of the week following the appointment, that the
appointee certify in writing to the appointing judge that the notice of appointment
was filed, and that no fees be awarded unless the appointee had filed the notice of
appointment and certification of compliance. Id. §§ 36.1(d), 36.4(c) (1990). Finally,
Part 36 was amended to include referees among the categories of appointments
subject to the rules; however, referees were not subject to the Part 36 filing
requirements if their compensation was not anticipated to exceed $550. Id. § 36.1(f)
(1994); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8003(b) (McKinney 1981).
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II. CRITICISMS OF THE PROCESS AND CALLS FOR REFORM
A.

Criticisms of the FiduciaryAppointment Process

Despite the stricter regulation of the appointment process
that followed promulgation of Part 36, widespread criticism
persisted. A stream of newspaper articles revealed pervasive
concerns with the appointment process, including allegations
that high-level political party officials, 53 former judges,5 4 and
relatives of court employees 55 were receiving numerous

53 See, e.g., Salvatore Arena, Top Politicians Get Lucrative Court Jobs, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 30, 2000, at 30; Joe Calderone & Thomas Zambito, System's
Exploiting the Helpless, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 21, 2001, at 6; Michael Finnegan,
Judge Rolls Out Pork Barrel, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Queens edition), June 20, 1993, at
1; Maggie Haberman et al., Here's Who Gets Pick of Judge's PatronagePlums, N.Y.
POST, Nov. 10, 1997, at 6; Dan Morrison, Dem Leader Profits From Court System:
Judges Steer Assignments to Manton's Firm, NEWSDAY, Jan. 30, 2000, at A8; Jack
Newfield, Judges: PatronageSaints to Their Pals, N.Y. POST, May 13, 1993, at 7;
Jordan Rau & Katie Thomas, Select Cast Gets Lucrative Roles, NEWSDAY, Sept. 24,
1999, at A7; Ed Tagliaferri, High-Paying Surrogate Court Cases Go to Politically
Connected Judges, Records Show, GANNETT SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS, June 10,
1998, at Al.
These charges were confirmed in the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments'
December 2001 report. The report revealed that one county political party leader
had received nearly 100 fiduciary appointments, another had received over
seventy-five appointments, the small firm of another had received over 200
appointments, the small firm of yet another had received over 100 appointments,
and a lawyer whose small firm employed a county political leader had received
nearly 100 appointments. COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 25-26.
64 See, e.g., Arena, supra note 53; Maggie Haberman, et al., Dirty Dozen Grab
Patronage $$$, N.Y. POST, Jan. 30, 2000, at 8; Newfield, supra note 53; Rau &
Thomas, supra note 53; Tagliaferri, supranote 53.
These charges were also confirmed in the report of the Commission. The report
cited examples of a former appellate judge receiving nearly 250 fiduciary
appointments, a former Surrogate receiving nearly 70 appointments, another
former Surrogate receiving nearly 60 appointments, a former Supreme Court
Justice receiving over 60 appointments and a former County Court Judge receiving
nearly 70 appointments. The report also revealed that one former judge was
awarded $424,000 in fees for a guardian ad litem appointment obtained within
three months of the judge's retirement from the bench, and another former judge
was awarded $350,000 for a receivership appointment obtained within a year of the
judge's retirement from the bench. COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 26.
56 See, e.g., Dan Morrison, Breaking the Rules, NEWSDAY, Oct. 17, 2000, at A3.
The Commission on Fiduciary Appointments reported, for example, that the spouse
of a high-level managerial court employee received nearly 250 appointments, the
spouse of a law secretary received over 100 appointments in that court and a county
clerk's son had been retained as property manager in numerous receivership cases
in that county. COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 26-27.
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appointments.
It was also revealed that lawyers who had
contributed money to judicial campaigns were receiving
56
appointments from those judges.
Suspicions of the role of political favoritism in fiduciary
appointments were underscored by the public disclosure in
January 2000 of a letter written by two politically-connected
Brooklyn lawyers. The lawyers, recipients of numerous fiduciary
appointments, had been retained but later dismissed as counsel
by another lawyer who had been appointed receiver in a
particularly lucrative receivership proceeding in Brooklyn
Supreme Court. In their letter, addressed to a top Brooklyn
Democratic Party official and distributed to dozens of party
operatives, the lawyers complained that despite years of loyal
party service, they were no longer obtaining their fair share of
fiduciary appointments from the courts.5 7 The letter, with its
plain implication that political party officials controlled the
assignment of fiduciaries, led to a firestorm of criticism of the
courts and calls for reform of the fiduciary appointment
58
process.
56 A 1998 bar association report revealed that a majority of the guardian ad
litem appointments of two New York City Surrogates who had recently run for office
were awarded to lawyers who either had contributed to the Surrogates' judicial
campaigns or worked with law firms that had contributed. See COMM. ON GOV'T

ETHICS OF THE AssN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CONTRIBUTIONS TO
CAMPAIGNS OF CANDIDATES FOR SURROGATE, AND APPOINTMENTS BY SURROGATES
OF GUARDIANS Ai) LITEM (July 1998), at http://www.abcny.org/surreport.html (last
visited Mar. 6, 2003).
57 The lawyers wrote that their "diligent work and unquestioned loyalty to the

[party] over the many years are clearly not as important as the desires of [the
receiver who had dismissed them in the case] ... [who] holds no party or elected
position in our County" and "has never assisted the [party's] Law Committee on any
level whether it be collecting signatures, binding petitions or trying an election law
case, etc." They further wrote that "[olne cannot reasonably expect our firm to
continue to avail to the [party] our professional services, the utilization of our
employees, and the use of our office facilities, while the [party] sits idly by and
permits [the receiver] to maliciously injure our practice and reputation without
consequence." COMMISSION, supra note 33, at App. D.
58 See, e.g., Courthouse Cronyism Merits Kaye's Fast Response, NEWSDAY
(Queens edition), Jan. 13, 2000, at A48; Alan Feuer, 2 Brooklyn Lawyers, ExInsiders, Outline a Court PatronageSystem, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2000, at B1; Justice
for Sale, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 7, 2000, at 40; Thomas J. Lueck, Giuliani Urges
Chief Judge to End Patronage in Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2000, at B5; Jack
Newfield, David Seifman, & Maggie Haberman, B'klyn Dems Rocked by Insider
'Patronage'Letter, N.Y. POST, Jan. 5, 2001, at 6; David Seifman & Maggie
Haberman, Rudy Asks Probe of Patronagein Brooklyn, N.Y. POST, Jan. 6, 2000, at
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Extensive problems were also subsequently documented in
the December 2001 report of the Special Inspector General for
Fiduciary Appointments, the official appointed by Chief Judge
Judith S. Kaye to investigate fiduciary appointment practices in
the New York courts. The Special Inspector General found that,
in many counties, the forms required in cases in which
fiduciaries are appointed-the notice of appointment, the
certification of compliance, and the statement of approval of
compensation 59 -were filed in a minimal number of cases. 60
Furthermore; in many of the cases in which guardians or
receivers retained counsel to assist them, the courts approved
compensation to the counsel for work that should have been
deemed part of the ordinary or routine responsibilities of the
guardian or receiver. 61 The Special Inspector General also found
that, contrary to the express requirements of the Part 36

4; Sidney Zion, Patronage Still Runs Politics, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 13, 2000, at
43.
59 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 26.3, 36.3(a) (2002).
60 Even in the counties with the best rate of filing compliance, in guardianship
cases the required forms were filed in less than half the cases and in receivership
cases forms were filed in barely one-third of the cases. Indeed, in all of the cases in
Brooklyn Supreme Court between 1995 and 2000 in which a receiver was appointed
(417 cases), not a single approval of compensation statement was filed. In
Surrogate's Court cases in which guardians ad litem were appointed, compliance
with the filing requirements was better, although in some counties the forms were
filed in only about half of the cases. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECT. GEN. FOR
FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENTS AND OFFICE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, INTERNAL AUDIT
UNIT, FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENTS IN NEW YORK: A REP. TO CHIEF JUDGE JUDITH S.
KAYE AND CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE JONATHAN LIPPMAN, (2001) [hereinafter

FIDUCIARY
APPOINTMENTS],
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/fiduciaryreport/ig
fiduciary.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2003).
61 For example, in guardianship cases, including those in which the appointed
guardians themselves were lawyers, judges approved legal fees for services such as
obtaining a bond, gathering the incapacitated person's assets, preparing the
guardian's reports and accountings, and preparing and filing the required forms.
Similarly, in receivership cases, including those in which the appointed receivers
were lawyers, judges approved legal fees for services such as preparing accountings
and billings and meeting with tenants and property managers. See FIDUCIARY
APPOINTMENTS, supra note 60. A related problem was the courts' failure to
distinguish between legal services and services not legal in nature that should have
been billed at considerably lower rates. For example, the report cited cases in which
lucrative hourly fees were approved for social visits with the incapacitated person
and shopping errands. Id.
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rules, 62receivers, and not judges, were appointing their counsel
63
and property managers.
B.

Recommendations of the Commission on Fiduciary
Appointments

In response to these developments and in addition to her
appointment of the Special Inspector General for Fiduciary
Appointments, Chief Judge Kaye established a "blue ribbon"
panel-the Commission on Fiduciary Appointments-with
responsibility to examine the existing rules and procedures
governing fiduciary appointments and to offer recommendations
on ways to improve them.6 4 The Commission conducted an
exhaustive review of the fiduciary appointment process in New
York, interviewing scores of judges, lawyers and court
administrators; holding public hearings; working closely with the
Special Inspector General; and reviewing fiduciary appointment
practices in other jurisdictions across the country. 65
The Commission released its report and recommendations in
December 2001. Its long list of recommendations fell within
three broad categories: (1) eligibility and qualifications, (2) the
appointment process, and (3) oversight of the appointment
process.
1.

Eligibility and Qualifications

Under the version of the Part 36 rules promulgated in 1986,
applicants for inclusion on the list of candidates for fiduciary
appointments required no qualifications; anyone who applied,

62 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.1 (1986).
63 An extreme result of this practice was that in Brooklyn, a single, small law
firm obtained roughly three-quarters of all counsel to receiver assignments over the
period examined. If the rules had been followed, two of the three attorneys in the
firm would not have been eligible for these assignments because they were the sons
of a sitting state supreme court judge. See id. § 36.1(b)(1) (2002); FIDUCIARY
APPOINTMENTS, supra note 60.
64 The Commission was chaired by Sheila L. Birnbaum, a prominent corporate
litigator. Among its other members were a former New York Court of Appeals judge,
a former Chief Administrative Judge of the New York courts, a former New York
State Bar Association president, a former Association of the Bar of the City of New
York president, a former New York City Corporation Counsel and a law school dean.
COMMISSION, supra note 33, at App. A.
65 See id. at 4-5.
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except relatives of judges, was placed on the list.66
The
Commission addressed this deficiency with a series of
recommendations. First, it recommended that persons seeking
eligibility for appointment as a fiduciary complete a training
67
program approved by the Chief Administrator of the Courts.
Noting that state law requires training before Article 81
fiduciaries, such as court evaluators, guardians, and court
examiners, may be appointed, 68 the Commission recommended
that other fiduciaries subject to the rules, including "secondary"
fiduciaries, be required to complete a training program on the
substantive issues pertaining to- the particular category of
fiduciary appointment. In addition to substantive training, the
Commission recommended that fiduciaries receive training on
the fiduciary appointment rules, including instruction on the
filings required of fiduciary appointees. 69
It was also
recommended that additional training of those who completed
the initial training should be required when necessary, such as
70
when major statutory changes are enacted.
The Commission further recommended that, in addition to
being related to a judge, a series of circumstances should
disqualify individuals from receiving a fiduciary appointment.
Noting the extensive negative publicity arising from the large
numbers of fiduciary appointments received by some political
party leaders and their law firms, the Commission recommended
that state and county political party chairs, their immediate
relatives, and their law firms be ineligible for fiduciary
appointments. 71 The ban on appointments would continue for
two years after the party chair stepped down. 72
The
Commission, however, expressly rejected the suggestion that
elected officials be ineligible for appointments as well. According
to the Commission, elected officials had not received large
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.1(b)(1) (1986).
COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 38.
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.39-.41 (McKinney 1996).
COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 38-39.
Id.
The Commission emphasized that party leaders exercise great influence over
the judicial nomination and selection process, and thus "[tihe sheer number of
appointments that they and their law firms have received... raises a troubling
perception that political considerations may be influencing these appointments." Id.
at 39.
72 See id. at 39-40.
66
67
68
69
70
71
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numbers
of appointments
or particularly high-paying
3
appointments.7
The Commission next recommended that former judges and
their relatives within the sixth degree of relationship be
ineligible for appointments for a two-year period after leaving
the bench.7 4 While recognizing that former judges may be among
the most qualified individuals to handle fiduciary assignments,
the Commission made note of the widely-held perception that
sitting judges favor their former colleagues when making
fiduciary appointments.75
A related recommendation was that the immediate relatives
of higher-level non-judicial employees of the court system be
ineligible for appointment and that the employees themselves
and their immediate relatives 76 be ineligible for appointment for
two years following their resignation or retirement from their
positions.7 7 The Commission concluded that many of the same
perceptions of favoritism can arise when relatives of court
employees, particularly higher-level court employees, receive
court appointments.
The Commission further recommended that persons
convicted of a felony offense be permanently ineligible for
appointment unless they received a certificate of relief from
disabilities.7 8 In addition, it was recommended that persons
convicted of a misdemeanor offense be ineligible for a period of
five years following their sentencing unless they received a
79
certificate of relief from disabilities.
73 Id. at 40.
74 Id. at 41-42.
75 Id. The Commission concluded that the two-year ban struck the appropriate
balance, citing similar two-year bans on former New York appellate judges
practicing in their former courts, N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 16.1
(2003), and former New York government employees practicing or appearing before
their former agencies, N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(8) (McKinney 2001).
76 A somewhat narrower ban on relatives of former court employees"immediate" relatives, as opposed to relatives within the sixth degree of
relationship-was proposed because it is judges, and not court employees, who
actually make the appointments. COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 40-41.
77 Id. at 40-42. "Higher-level" employees were defined as those who are
required under the court system's rules to file an annual financial disclosure
statement. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 40.2(a) (2003).
78 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 43.
79 Id. The Commission also recommended that a conviction of any offense (other
than a traffic violation) be disclosed in the application for inclusion on the
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Finally, the Commission noted that no procedure existed to
remove from the appointment lists individuals who fail to follow
the rules, are incompetent, or commit other misconduct in their
performance as fiduciaries. Accordingly, it was recommended
that the fiduciary rules be amended to authorize the Chief
Administrator of the Courts to remove an individual from the
80
appointment lists for good cause.
2.

The Appointment Process

The Commission devoted considerable attention to the
process for selecting appointees. Central to this examination
was the question of whether judges should retain full authority
to select the fiduciary. Some, including the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, recommended that appointees be
selected randomly, preferably by computer, from the
appointment lists.81 The virtue of this approach is that it would
foreclose any suggestion that the appointments were influenced
by favoritism or other inappropriate factors.8 2
Others
recommended variations of this approach, such as requiring the
judge to select the appointee from a small group of candidates
randomly selected from the appointment lists.83 In the end, the
Commission recommended that judges continue to have full
authority to select the fiduciary. The Commission reasoned that
the primary objective should be the selection of an individual
who will provide quality service to the court and the parties, and
that is best achieved where the judge has discretion to select a
candidate with the skill and experience necessary to meet the
84
demands of the particular assignment.
appointment lists, as should any personal bankruptcy history. Id. at 43-44.
80 Id. at 44.
81 Id. at 45.
82 Although apparently no other states have adopted such a system for court
appointments, appointments of interim trustees in United States Bankruptcy Court
cases are made on a strict rotational basis from a panel of qualified candidates.
Additionally, Massachusetts requires that appointments be made successively from
a court's appointment lists, although the judge may deviate from that process by
providing a written statement of the reasons for doing so. MASS. SUP. CT. R. 1:07(3)
(2000).
83 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 45.
84 As the Commission stated:

[Plotential candidates for a fiduciary appointment typically possess widely
varying skills and experience ... [and] cases in which fiduciaries are
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The Commission further recommended that judges be
required to select appointees from appointment lists compiled by
the Office of Court Administration, and if judges deviated from
the list in making an appointment, they should have to provide a
written explanation.8 5 The Commission recognized, however,
that if judges were to be expected to select appointees from the
appointment lists, the lists would have to be made more
meaningful. Thus, in addition to requiring training for inclusion
on the lists,86 the Commission recommended that specialized
lists be created based on the fiduciary category-for example,
guardian, receiver, guardian ad litem-for which the applicant is
seeking appointment. 87 It was also suggested that consideration
be given to categorizing the appointment lists based on
experience, similar to the appointment lists for attorneys
defendants.8 8
indigent criminal
to represent
assigned
Additionally, to remedy the fact that the lists contained
"hundreds, if not thousands" of people who had retired or were
otherwise no longer available for appointment, it was
recommended that all those on the lists be required to re-register
89
every two years.
The Commission also recommended that three additional
types of appointees be covered by the rules: court examiners,
supplemental needs trustees, and private pay law guardians. 90
Court examiners, who review the periodic accountings and
appointed can raise different issues and problems, and thus require
particular services and talents. As a result... any system in which
fiduciaries are randomly assigned will frequently fail to match the
appropriate appointee to the appropriate case. Although judges themselves
sometimes have difficulty making the correct match in some cases, they do

a far better job than would a system of random selection.
Id. at 45-46.
85 Id. at 46-47. The Commission recommended, however, that an appointee
who is not on the appointment list should still have to meet all the criteria for

inclusion on the list (e.g., not a relative of a judge, not a political party leader, etc.).
Id. at 47.
86 See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
87 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 46-47. The Commission noted that if
separate training was required for each discrete appointment category, applicants
would not, as experience had shown, routinely seek eligibility for most (or even all)
categories. This would result in appointment lists that are smaller and easier to use

than the present lists. Id. at 48.
88 Id. at 48.
89 Id. at 48-49.

90 Id. at 49-50.
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reports filed with the court by guardians and report to the court
on those filings,9 1 are selected from lists compiled by the
appellate division and were not subject to any of the
requirements of the fiduciary rules. The Commission, however,
discerned no reason why they should be treated differently from
the other court appointees in guardianship proceedings, such as
guardians and court evaluators. 92 Supplemental needs trustees
are appointed to administer trusts typically established so that
persons under a disability may continue to maintain Medicaid
eligibility after receiving a personal injury award. 93 They are
similar to guardians of property, and they take their fees from
the proceeds of the trusts. 94 Private pay law guardians are
appointed in matrimonial cases to advocate for the interests of
children affected by the litigation. 95 Their fees are paid by the
parties.
The Commission recommended that additional types of
"secondary" appointees be covered by the rules as well. 96 It was
recommended that the rules continue to apply to secondary
appointments in receivership cases. 97
Further, it was
91 See supranote 15 and accompanying text.
92 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 49.
93 See id. at 49.
9 See id. at 49-50.
95 See id. at 50-51. The role of private pay law guardians is often confused with
that of guardians ad litem, who may also be appointed in matrimonial cases.
Generally, a guardian ad litem is appointed to report to the court on the interests of
the child, whereas a law guardian performs the more traditional role of a lawyer
serving the interests of the child.
96 Id. at 51.
97 Id. This provision in the rules had generated considerable controversy even
before the Commission recommended its continuation. In a March 9, 2000
memorandum from the Chief Administrative Judge (on file with author), judges
were reminded that the rules applied to secondary appointments in receivership
cases, and as a result the judges, not the receivers, were required to make these
appointments. Some judges questioned the legality of a court rule mandating that
judges appoint counsel to a receiver, citing C.P.L.R. § 6401(b), which provides that a
receiver "shall have no power to employ counsel unless expressly so authorized by
order of the court." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6401(b) (McKinney 2003). These judges
apparently read this provision as requiring that the judge first must provide the
receiver with the general authority to retain counsel, but that once the judge does
so, only the receiver, not the judge, may select the counsel. This strained reading of
the statute was rejected by court administrators, and subsequently, when a number
of judges permitted receivers to select their own counsel, the judges were
investigated by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. See Daniel Wise, Judges
Face Investigations over Hirings by Receivers, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 13, 2002, at 1. It was
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recommended that the rules apply to counsel for Article 81
guardians, accountants for Article 81 guardians, and assistants
to guardians ad litem.
The Commission found that these
appointments had become increasingly common and could
involve substantial fees. 98 Thus, while the appointments should
be made by the judge, the primary appointee should be able to
request that the court appoint a particular individual. 99
The Commission recommended important new limits on the
number of higher-paying appointments that individual
appointees may receive. To the surprise of some, it proposed
that the existing $5000 rule-limiting appointees to one
appointment within a twelve-month period in which the
compensation is anticipated to be more than $5000-be
continued.100 The Commission acknowledged that, because this
rule requires the appointee to anticipate at the outset of the
appointment what the ultimate compensation will be-a difficult
factor to calculate in many cases as it can often turn on the
duration of the appointment-it is "confusing and largely
unenforceable. "101 Nevertheless, it concluded that the $5000 rule
was of some value, particularly if combined with a rule that
limited additional appointments based on the actual
compensation an appointee received during a given period. In
that regard, the Commission proposed that once an appointee
exceeded a threshold of $25,000 awarded for all of his or her
appointments during any twelve-month period, the appointee
should be ineligible to receive another appointment during the
next twelve-month period. 102 In the Commission's view, this was
a less confusing rule because it required no estimation of what
the ultimate compensation might be in the case. It also would
help address what the Commission had found was a practice by
some appointees of deliberate under-billing-e.g., seeking an

later reported that the judges ultimately were not disciplined because they had
agreed to follow the rules in future cases. Nancie L. Katz, 5 Judges in Probe Get
Only a Warning, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 14, 2002, at 12; Not Even a Slap on the
Wrist, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 20, 2002.
98 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 51.
99 See id. at 51-52.
100 Id. at 53.

101Id. at 52.
102 Id.

at 53.
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award of only $4900 in a case-to avoid the limitations of the
10 3
$5000 rule.
Finally, the Commission recommended a series of measures
designed to curb inappropriate fiduciary billing practices. Citing
the Special Inspector General's finding that, in many cases,
counsel to receivers or guardians received compensation at high
hourly legal rates for work that the receivers or guardians
0 4
should have performed as part of their own responsibilities,
the Commission urged judges not to appoint counsel to a receiver
or guardian unless it is clear that counsel will be performing
legal work. 10 5 In addition, it was proposed that, absent a
convincing reason such as significant cost savings, judges should
not be authorized to appoint the receiver or guardian as his or
her own counsel. 0 6 Moreover, the Commission proposed that
judges be required to refuse compensation to counsel or to deduct
counsel's compensation from that of the receiver or guardian for
work that should have been performed by the receiver or
07
guardian.
3.

Oversight of the Appointment Process

Recognizing that many abuses can be avoided if the public is
provided with comprehensive, accurate information about which
judges are making fiduciary appointments, who is receiving the
appointments, and how much compensation is being paid, the
Commission made extensive recommendations to improve
compliance with the fiduciary filing requirements.
These
recommendations, in fact, were made in the form of interim
recommendations prior to the issuance of the Commission's final
report. Court administrators responded by implementing a new
oversight process in March 2001.108
Under this new process, a special fiduciary clerk has been
designated in each of New York's twelve judicial districts. When
103
104
105

See id.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 54-55.

106 Id. at 55.
107 Id.

108The Commission's interim recommendations were attached to its December
2001 report. See id. at App. E. The Chief Administrative Judge's memorandum to
the District Administrative Judges outlining the new process was also attached to
the Commission's report. Id. at App. F.
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a judge makes an appointment, the fiduciary clerk sends the
official forms-the notice of appointment and the certification of
compliance-to the appointee. The appointee then completes the
forms and returns them to the fiduciary clerk, who sends them
on to the Office of Court Administration and places copies in the
court file. When the appointee seeks approval to be paid, he or
she must obtain written confirmation from the fiduciary clerk
that all required forms have been filed, and the judge may not
approve compensation unless such confirmation is provided.
Upon approving compensation to the appointee, the judge must
submit the approval of compensation form to the fiduciary clerk,
who then transmits the form to the Office of Court
Administration. The Office of Court Administration enters
relevant information from the forms into a fiduciary
appointment database.
C.

Reaction to the Commission's Recommendations

Following the release of the Commission's December 2001
report, the court system invited public comment on the report's
recommendations. Extensive comments were received from a
wide range of bar associations, judges, social service agencies,
and legal practitioners. 10 9
The responses were generally
supportive, particularly with regard to the recommendations
concerning training, upgrading qualifications, using specialized
lists, and enhancing oversight of the appointment process.
There was considerable opposition, however, to several of the
recommendations, particularly the proposed ban on appointing
retired judges, the proposed new limits on the number of higherpaying appointments that individual fiduciaries may receive,
and the proposed extension of those limits to "secondary"
appointments.
A number of the bar associations and judicial associations
opposed the recommendation that retired judges be ineligible for
appointments for a two-year period after they leave the bench.
These groups emphasized that retired judges are among the

109 Indeed, a special committee of the New York State Bar Association created

to review the Commission's recommendations issued its own report, fifty pages in
length, on the recommendations. See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, REP. OF THE SPECIAL
COMM. ON FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENTS, (May 2002).
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most qualified individuals to receive appointments. 110 It was
also suggested that any disqualification of retired judges be
limited to the jurisdiction where the retired judge sat.
A great many of those commenting expressed their
opposition to the recommended limits on higher-paying
appointments.
It was argued that the proposed $25,000
limitation would sharply reduce the number of individuals
available for appointment.
This was particularly so in
guardianship
cases,
which
require highly
specialized
practitioners with both legal knowledge regarding financial
management and the ability to assess and take care of the
personal needs of incapacitated persons."' It was also pointed
out that the proposed limitation, if applied to non-profit
institutions that provide guardian services, would effectively put
them out of business, greatly reducing the supply of providers
who serve as guardians for persons of limited means. As for the
$5000 rule, commentators argued that it was confusing,
unenforceable, and out-of-date.
Many were opposed to the inclusion of "secondary"
appointments within the scope of the rules. Concerns were
raised that requiring secondary appointees to meet the screening
and filing requirements would raise the costs of their services for
the receivers and guardians who need them.
There was
additional concern that, in guardianship proceedings in which
the guardians were not professionals, it would be unduly
burdensome for them to have to return to court for authorization
every time they sought to hire a professional for assistance in
preparing the annual reports and accountings. The state bar
argued that, in receivership cases, enhanced oversight of
secondary appointees was unnecessary because the adversarial
112
system will prevent the waste of assets.

110 See id. at 26.

M See id. at 39-40.
See id. at 36. The report stated that "mortgage foreclosure actions are
contested matters with two or more financially interested parties represented by
counsel .... [I1f the appointment of counsel for the receiver and the property
managers are [sic] made by motion on notice, the parties principally interested in
the management of the property and the fimds produced will have an opportunity to
be heard." Id.
112
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III. THE NEW RULES AND PROCEDURES

A.

The New Part36

Following a review of the public comments on the
Commission's recommendations and after consulting with the
Administrative Board of the Courts and obtaining approval from
the Court of Appeals, 1 3 Chief Judge Kaye repealed the old rules
and promulgated a new Part 36 of the Rules of the Chief
Judge. 114 They apply to the appointment of guardians, court
evaluators, attorneys for alleged incapacitated persons,
guardians ad litem, 115 referees, 116 receivers, and persons or
entities performing services for receivers-that is, all of the
appointments covered under the old rules. 117 In addition, the
rules now apply to law guardians who are not paid from public
funds, court examiners, supplemental needs trustees, and
persons or entities performing services for guardians. 118
By their terms, the rules do not apply to a number of other
appointments. 19 These include a guardian who is a relative of
the incapacitated person or who has been nominated as guardian
or proposed as guardian by the incapacitated person, 20 a person
113 Administrative rules of the Chief Judge must be approved by the Court of
Appeals, after consultation with the Administrative Board of the Courts. N.Y. JUD.

LAW

§

211(2) (McKinney 2003).

114 N.Y.

COMp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36 (2003), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/fiduciaryreport/part36.htm. The new rules take full
effect on June 1, 2003.
115 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.1(a) (2003). The rules now define
guardians ad litem as those "appointed to investigate and report to the court on
particular issues, and their counsel and assistants." Id. § 36. 1(a)(2).
116 Id.

§ 36.1(a)(9). The rules do not, however, apply to referees serving as

special masters or otherwise serving in a judicial capacity. Id.
117Id. § 36.1(a).

118 Id. For both receivership and guardianship proceedings, the new rules
define these secondary appointments as counsel, accountants, auctioneers,
appraisers, property managers, and real estate brokers. Id. § 36.1(a)(10).
119 Even, however, appointees who are expressly exempted from the regulation

of the Part 36 rules are still ineligible for appointment if they have been convicted of
a felony or a misdemeanor (for five years following imposition of the misdemeanor
sentence) or have been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. See id.
§ 36.2(c)(7); see also infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
120 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.1(b)(2)(i)(2003). This includes a

guardian ad litem nominated by an infant fourteen years of age or older pursuant to
section 403-a of the New York Surrogate's
§ 36.1(b)(2)(ii).

Court

Procedure Act.

See id.
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or institution whose appointment is required by law, 12 1 a public
administrator, 1 22 a nonprofit institution serving as a guardian or
123
court evaluator-including the Mental Hygiene Legal Service,
a law guardian appointed pursuant to section 243 of the New
York Family Court Act, 124 a bank or trust company as a
depository for funds or as a supplemental needs trustee, 125 and a
guardian ad litem appointed as a physician where emergency
medical treatment is necessary. 126 Notably, the rules further
provide that persons or entities performing services for these
127
exempted appointees are also exempt from the rules.
The new rules adopt the Commission's recommendation that
the judge presiding over the case have the authority to select the
fiduciary and that, in general, the judge must select the
appointee from lists established by the Chief Administrator of
the Courts. 128 The judge may appoint someone not on the list
only upon a finding of "good cause," which must be set forth in
writing and filed with the fiduciary clerk and the Chief
Administrator. 129 Those appointed who are not on the list,
however, must still comply with all of the requirements and
limitations of the rules. In other words, even though they have
not applied for placement on the appointment list, they must
meet the qualifications for doing so, and they must file all
130
necessary forms relating to their appointment.
Under the new rules, additional categories of persons are
ineligible for placement on the appointment list. As was true
under the prior rules, relatives of judges within the sixth degree
See id. § 36. 1(b)(2)(vi).
See id. § 36.1(b)(2)(v).
123 See id. § 36. 1(b)(1).
124 See id. These are law guardians who are appointed to represent children in
Family Court proceedings and who are paid from public funds. Id.
125 See id. § 36.1(b)(2)(iv).
126 See id. § 36.1(b)(2)(vii).
127 See id. § 36.1(b)(2).
128 See id. § 36.2(a)-(b).
129 See id. § 36.2(b)(2). Although the rules provide judges with this limited
authority to appoint someone not on the list, an individual who has been
affirmatively removed from the list may not be appointed under any circumstances.
Id.; see also infra note 152 and accompanying text.
130 See. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.2(b)(3) (2003). The
appointing judge, however, may waive any education and training requirements
that otherwise would apply to the appointment if satisfaction of those requirements
would not be practical. Id.
121
122
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of relationship continue to be ineligible for appointment, as are
judicial hearing officers in the county where they serve on the
judicial hearing officer panel. 13 1 A series of new disqualifying
criteria, however, now also apply. Former New York State
judges and their immediate relatives 132 are ineligible for
appointment within the jurisdiction where they served for two
years after they leave the bench. 133 Full-time and part-time New
York State court employees and their immediate relatives are
ineligible, as are the immediate relatives of higher-level court
State and county political party chairs and
employees. 3 4
executive directors, their immediate relatives, and law firms or
other businesses with which they are employed are ineligible for
appointment while the party official serves in that capacity and
for a period of two years after stepping down from such
Judicial campaign officials, their immediate
position. 135
relatives, and their law firms are ineligible for appointment by
the judge for whom they campaigned for a two-year period
Finally, disbarred and
following the judicial election. 3 6
suspended attorneys are ineligible during the period of their
disbarment or suspension, 137 and convicted felons and

131 See
132 See

id. § 36.2(c)(1)-(2).
id. As used herein, "immediate relatives" includes a spouse, sibling,
parent, or child. Id. § 36.2(c)(4)(i).
133 See id. § 36.2(c)(5). Jurisdiction is defined as statewide for Court of Appeals
judges, judicial department for Appellate Division judges, principal judicial district
in which they served for supreme court judges and court of claims judges, and
principal county in which they served for all other judges. Id.
134 See id. § 36.2(c)(3). The relatives are ineligible for appointment within the
judicial district where the higher-level employee is employed, or statewide if the
higher-level employee has statewide responsibilities. See id. Higher-level court
employees are defined in the rules as those who hold a grade within the court
system's salary structure of higher than JG24, or its equivalent. See id.
135 See id. § 36.2(c)(4)(i). Notably, this prohibition is broader than an analogous
provision in the New York Public Officers Law that bars political party chairs and
various elected officials and public employees from practicing law before, or
transacting business with, a state agency. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73 (McKinney
2001). That statutory ban does not extend to a law firm or other organization
employing the party chair or public official if he or she does not share in the firm's
or organization's net revenues. See id. § 73(10).
136 See. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.2(c)(4)(ii) (2003). The
prohibition applies to a campaign chair, manager, treasurer, or finance chair. Id.
137 See id. § 36.2(c)(6).
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misdemeanants-though only for five years following their
138
sentencing for the misdemeanor-are ineligible.
Additionally, the rules render ineligible certain individuals
who are otherwise ineligible for placement on the appointment
list for particular categories of appointments. A person who has
been appointed as court evaluator in a guardianship proceeding
may not be appointed as guardian to the subject of that
proceeding unless there are "extenuating circumstances" that
the appointing judge sets forth in writing and files with the
fiduciary clerk. 139 On the other hand, a person who has been
appointed as the attorney for an alleged incapacitated person
may not be appointed as guardian to that person or as counsel to
the guardian of that person under any circumstances. 140 The
rules also provide that, absent a compelling reason, a receiver or
4
guardian may not be appointed as his or her own counsel.' '
Despite the extensive criticism of the Commission's
recommendations for limitations on appointments based on
138 See id. § 36.2(c)(7). The prohibition on misdemeanants can be waived by the
Chief Administrator of the Courts. Id. In addition, a convicted felon or
misdemeanant can become eligible upon receipt of a certificate of relief from
disabilities. See id. See generally N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2002)
(prescribing procedures for issuance of certificates of relief from disabilities).
139 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.2(c)(10) (2003). The court
evaluator, who must recommend to the court whether a guardian should be
appointed for the alleged incapacitated person, has a potential conflict of interest if
he or she has an opportunity to be appointed as the guardian in that case. The
exception recognizes, however, that in some cases it might make good sense to
appoint court evaluators as the guardian, such as where they have developed a
relationship of trust with the incapacitated person.
140 See id. § 36.2(c)(9). Like the court evaluator, the attorney for the alleged
incapacitated person may also develop a relationship of trust with the incapacitated
person. Nevertheless, because of the attorney's role as the advocate for the
incapacitated person, the potential conflict of interest is even greater. Thus, the
rules establish a strict ban on the attorney's eligibility for the guardianship
appointment.
141 See id. § 36.2(c)(8). The prohibition also applies to the receiver's or
guardian's law firm. A related provision in the new rules states that "[a]ppointees
who serve as counsel to a guardian or receiver shall not be compensated as counsel
for services that should have been performed by the guardian or receiver." Id. §
36.4(b)(4). These provisions are designed to address the "double dipping" abuses
documented in the Special Inspector General's report in which counsel to guardians
and receivers (which in some cases were the same person) performed work that
should have been deemed part of the guardian's or receiver's routine responsibilities
and then were paid separate hourly legal fees above and beyond the commissions
that were paid to the guardian or receiver. See supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
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compensation, 142 the new rules include two important provisions
of that nature. First, the rules continue the $5000 rule but with
some key changes. The new rule limits an appointee to one
appointment within a calendar year for which the compensation
anticipated to be awarded within any calendar year exceeds
$5000.143 Basing the rule on appointments within a calendar
year, rather than within the floating twelve-month period
employed in the prior rule, makes the rule easier to comply with
and enforce. Also, the new rule's focus on compensation to be
awarded within any calendar year significantly narrows its scope
in certain cases. For example, under the previous rule, a
relatively modest guardianship appointment expected to pay
only $500 per year would have implicated the rule if the
incapacitated person was expected to live more than ten years.
Finally, unlike the old version, the new rule contains no
exceptions.144
The new rules also adopt the Commission's recommendation
for a limitation based on actual compensation received. The new
rule provides that if an appointee is awarded more than an
aggregate of $50,000 in compensation during a calendar year for
all of his or her appointments, then the appointee is ineligible for
new appointments in the following calendar year. 145 The new
142 See

supra note 111 and accompanying text.

143N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.2(d)(1) (2003). "Compensation" is

defined as "awards by a court of fees, commissions, allowances or other
compensation, excluding costs and disbursements." Id. § 36.2(d)(3).
144 The prior version permitted an exception where the judge found "unusual
circumstances of continuity of representation or familiarity with a case." Id.
§ 36.1(c).
Application of the $5000 rule to "private pay" law guardians, who for the first
time are now covered by Part 36, see id. § 36.1(a)(3) (2003), may be problematic.
"Private pay" law guardians, assigned to represent children in what are frequently
hotly litigated matrimonial cases, routinely bill more than $5000 for their services
(particularly in some of the state's larger counties). Application of the $5000 rule to
these appointments, therefore, may have the effect of limiting the appointees to a
single appointment in a calendar year, a result that was neither desired nor
anticipated. Amendment of the new rules to exempt these appointments from the
$5000 rule, or possibly to raise the $5000 threshold, should be considered.
145 See id. § 36.2(d)(2). The rule refers to compensation "awarded" rather than
to compensation received. This was intended to prevent appointees, many of whom
pay themselves after obtaining approval from the court to do so, from manipulating
the timing of when they actually received their compensation. Since many
appointees, however, may also control the timing of their requests for approval of
compensation, the potential for manipulation may not have been entirely
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rule thus doubles the $25,000 threshold that the Commission
had suggested, and, as is true for the new $5000 rule, it is geared
to calendar years rather than floating twelve month time
periods. Like the new $5000 rule, the $50,000 rule contains no
exceptions. 146 It should be emphasized, however, that the
$50,000 rule in no way imposes a cap or otherwise limits the
compensation that fiduciaries may receive in cases in which they
already have been appointed. 147 Rather, the rule simply bars an
individual from receiving new appointments in the next calendar
year once he or she is awarded compensation in excess of $50,000
from all of his or her appointments in a given calendar year.
Unlike the $5000 rule, when the appointment was made is not
relevant; the question is when the compensation is awarded.
For the most part, the administration of Part 36 has not
changed under the new rules. Individuals interested in serving
as fiduciaries must file an application with the Office of Court
Administration. 148 The application requires information about
the individual's background and experience and requires the
applicant to designate the categories of appointments they are
interested in and the counties in which they seek to be
appointed. 149 The Office of Court Administration is developing
appointment lists in each county for each of the appointment
categories. 50 The lists will be contained in the Unified Court
System's computer network that is available to judges and court
personnel throughout the state. Unlike in the past, those on the
appointment lists will be required to re-register every two years
to remain on the lists.' 5 ' In addition, the Chief Administrator of
the Courts is now authorized to remove individuals from the list

eliminated.
146 Both the $5000 rule and the $50,000 rule are based on "fees, commissions,
allowances or other compensation," not including costs and disbursements. Id.
§ 36.2(d)(3).
147 Cf. id. § 36.4(b)(4) ("Compensation to appointees shall not exceed the fair
value of services rendered.").
148 Id. § 36.3(a).
149 See Unified Court System Form 870.
150 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.3(c) (2003). Although the
rules permit separate lists within an appointment category based on level of
experience, id., the Office of Court Administration has no immediate plans to
establish such lists.
151 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.3(d) (2003).
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for "unsatisfactory performance or any conduct incompatible
152
with appointment."
A major change in the procedures governing the
appointment lists is the new training requirement. The rules
require the Chief Administrator to establish education and
1
training requirements for placement on the appointment Jists. 53
In implementing this mandate, the Chief Administrator is
requiring those seeking appointment in the "primary" fiduciary
categories 154 to complete a substantive training program for the
Those seeking
category of appointment. 155
particular 156
"secondary" appointments are not being required to complete a
Given that they perform a
substantive training program.
narrower role than the primary appointees, their licensing
status in their respective areas is recognized as meeting the
education and training requirement of the rules. Along with the
substantive training requirement, those seeking inclusion on the
appointment lists must also certify that they have carefully
reviewed the Part 36 rules and a written explanation of the rules
that is provided to all applicants.
Finally, the new rules continue the requirement that
appointees file a notice of appointment and certification of
compliance (which will be a single combined form) at the time of
appointment. 57 In addition, when seeking compensation in
excess of five hundred dollars for their work, appointees must
152 See id. § 36.3(e).

153 See id. § 36.3(b).

154 These include guardians, court evaluators, court examiners, attorneys for
alleged incapacitated persons, guardians ad litem, law guardians, supplemental
needs trustees, and receivers. See id. § 36.1(a)(1)-(9). Referees are not being
required to complete a formal training program.
'55

The Chief Administrator must certify the programs, most of which are being

conducted by bar associations. Attendance at some programs held prior to the

effective date of the rules, particularly Article 81 training programs, is being
recognized and credited.
156 These are the persons who perform services for guardians or receivers, and

include counsel, accountants, auctioneers, appraisers, property managers, and real
estate brokers. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.1(a)(10) (2003).
157 See id. § 36.4(a)(1). The fiduciary clerk sends the form and other relevant
information to the appointee at the time of appointment. The appointee then must

complete the form and return it to the fiduciary clerk within thirty days of the
appointment. Id. Appointees who will be receiving no compensation for their work

are not subject to the requirements of the rules, id. § 36.1(b)(3), except that they
must complete the notice of appointment portion of the form and file it with the
fiduciary clerk, id. § 36.4(a)(1).
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submit to the court a statement of approval of compensation
containing the fiduciary clerk's written confirmation that the
appointee has filed the notice of appointment and certification of
compliance. 15 The rules expressly provide that a judge may not
approve compensation unless such confirmation has been
provided. 159 Upon awarding compensation to the fiduciary, the
judge must sign the approval of compensation statement which
specifies the amount approved and transmit it to the fiduciary
clerk. 160 The fiduciary clerk will send the forms to the Office of
Court Administration, where all relevant information will be
entered into a central fiduciary appointment database available
to judges and court personnel throughout the state. In addition,
the Office of Court Administration plans to publish on the court
system's web site the names of all persons who receive fiduciary
appointments, the judges who made the appointments, and the
161
compensation awarded.
B.

FutureMeasures

Although the new Part 36 rules are comprehensive in their
scope and will lead to major improvements in the fiduciary
appointment process, further issues should be examined and
additional steps should be considered if problems persist.
Perhaps the most controversial of the potential measures is a
random or rotational assignment system. In preserving the
judge's authority to select the fiduciary, the new rules reflect the
conclusion of the Commission that, on balance, judicial discretion
best meets the needs of the litigants and the courts. 162 The
primary drawback of judicial discretion, however, is that it can
allow for, or at least create the perception of, favoritism in the
selection process. Indeed, although the rules now disqualify
158 See id. § 36.4(b)(1).
159 See id. § 36.4(b)(2).
160 The rules governing statements of approval of compensation, set forth in

Part 26 of the Rules of the Chief Judge, derive from section 35-a of the New York
Judiciary Law. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. Part 36 also requires
that whenever a judge approves compensation greater than $5000, he or she must

file a written explanation with the fiduciary clerk. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 22, § 36.4(b)(3) (2003).
161 See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.5(b) (2003). The

New York State Unified
http://www.courts.state.ny.us.

Court

System's

162 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.

web

site

is

located

at
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certain individuals from appointment and impose new
limitations on the number of appointments that individual
appointees may receive, they do not completely eliminate the
potential for politics or other inappropriate factors to continue to
influence the appointment process.
If ongoing examination
reveals that such factors continue to exert significant influence
on fiduciary appointments, a stronger argument could be made
for some form of a random appointment process. One possibility
might be to require the judge to select the appointee from a
small group of candidates randomly selected from the
appointment list. A variation of that approach would be to
require selection from a randomly selected group but permit
discretion to select someone else if the judge sets forth in writing
good cause for doing so.
Another area for possible future reform is stricter regulation
of fiduciary compensation. Although the new rules provide that
"[c]ompensation to appointees shall not exceed the fair value of
services rendered,"1 63 there is no guarantee that this general
admonition will eliminate billing abuses by fiduciaries.1 6 4
Greater judicial scrutiny of applications for approval of
compensation is critical, particularly for fiduciaries who are paid
hourly fees for their services. 165 Ultimately, however, serious
consideration may have to be given to establishing fee schedules
that prescribe the authorized compensation for work performed
by fiduciaries. 166

163N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.4(b)(4) (2003).

See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
Typically, these include guardians ad litem, law guardians, court evaluators,
attorneys for alleged incapacitated persons, and secondary appointees. With regard
to secondary appointees, the rules also seek to prevent "double billing" situations in
which counsel to guardians and counsel to receivers are compensated for work that
should have been performed by the primary fiduciary. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 22, § 36.4(b)(4) (2003) ("Appointees who serve as counsel to a guardian or
receiver shall not be compensated as counsel for services that should have been
performed by the guardian or receiver.").
166 Fee schedules could be enacted by the State legislature, cf N.Y. COUNTY
LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1991) (setting compensation for counsel assigned to
represent indigent criminal defendants and indigent adult litigants in Family
Court), or promulgated by the courts, either pursuant to statutory delegation by the
Legislature, cf.N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b(5) (McKinney 2002) (delegating authority to
Court of Appeals to approve fee schedule for assigned counsel in capital cases), or on
their own, cf.Admin. Order No. 73 of the Chief Admin. of the Courts, (February 6,
1992) (promulgating fee schedules for court-appointed experts).
164
165
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The Commission highlighted the need for a better system of
providing guardians in cases in which the incapacitated person
has minimal or no assets. 167 In some cases, legal service offices
or social service agencies are available to serve as guardian. In
many other cases, however, the courts rely on private attorneys
to handle these assignments on a pro bono basis. These are
often particularly difficult assignments because they can last for
years and can involve extensive work during non-business hours.
As a result, some judges reward those who take pro bono
assignments with lucrative assignments when they become
available-a practice that some have criticized.
In any event, a more coordinated approach to assigning
guardians in these cases is needed. Some states, such as
California and Illinois, have created public guardian offices to
handle cases involving minimal assets. 168 These offices may also
be assigned cases in which an incapacitated person has assets;
the fees paid in those cases help offset the general expenses of
operating their offices. The state legislature should consider
such an approach for New York, particularly if public guardian
offices can be established with limited cost to the taxpayers. As
our population continues to age, the demand for guardianship
169
services will only increase.
Another subject in need of further study is the role of court
examiners. Court examiners are appointed in guardianship
proceedings to assess the periodic reports and accountings filed
by the guardians. 170 Thus, they are appointed to assist the court
in
ensuring
that
guardians
adequately
meet
their
responsibilities in managing the financial and personal affairs of
their wards.
It is widely suspected, however, that court

COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 61-62.
See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 27430 (Deering 2003); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
3955/30 (West 2002).
167

168

169 A variation of the public guardian approach has been in place in
Westchester County since the mid-1990s. In all cases in which a relative, friend, or
other person is not available for nomination, the court appoints a local non-profit
social service agency as guardian, whether the incapacitated person has assets or
not. The fees received from the cases with assets, supplemented by a modest
appropriation from the county government, enables the social service agency, which
has social workers, accountants, and other professionals on its staff, to meet its
expenses.
170 See supranote 15 and accompanying text.
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examiners often do not adequately fulfill this function. 17
By
subjecting court examiners for the first time to the same
regulation as other Article 81 appointees, the new rules take an
important step in the right direction. Yet it should be reevaluated whether private individuals paid from the assets of
the incapacitated persons are necessary to perform this oversight
function.
Rather than perpetuating another layer of
appointments in guardianship cases, it may be that court
personnel could fulfill this role as well, if not better, than private
appointees.172
Finally, one area of concern not addressed at all by the
Commission or by the new rules is the operation of the public
administrator offices. 173 Every county in New York has a public
administrator who is authorized by law to act as the fiduciary of
an estate when no other person is eligible and available to serve
as administrator or executor. 74 In the five counties of New York
171 An egregious example of this was brought to public attention shortly before
the release of the new Part 36 rules. In November 2002, the Queens County District
Attorney announced the indictment of an attorney who had received over 150
fiduciary appointments in Queens County. The indictment charged the attorney
with stealing over $1 million from the funds of six incapacitated persons for whom
he had been appointed as guardian. See Press Release, Queens County District
Attorney's Office, Court-Appointed Long Island City Attorney Indicted on Charges
of Stealing Over $1.2 Million From Funds of Six Incapacitated Individuals Including
Teen Born Totally Disabled, Quadriplegic and Alzheimers' Victim; Over 150
Additional Fiduciary Appointments of Defendant Under Investigation (Nov. 18,
2002), http://www.queensda.orgPress%20Releases/Press%2ORelease%2OMain%20
Page.htm. In two of the cases, the amounts allegedly stolen exceeded $500,000.
Suspicions were raised when the Public Administrator's Office discovered
irregularities in the finances of one of the incapacitated persons, who had died. See
id. It seems clear that if the court examiners assigned to these cases had been
adequately monitoring the performance of the guardian they would have uncovered
these thefts.
172 In this regard, the New York court ystem has initiated a pilot program in
two counties in which the Office of Court Administration's internal auditors are
being randomly appointed as court examiners in a select number of cases. See Press
Release, New York State Unified Court System, Courts Adopt New Fiduciary
Appointment Rules (Dec. 2, 2002) (on file with author). The purpose of the program
is to test whether an alternative approach to the appointment of private individuals
as court examiners is viable.
173 Indeed, the rules expressly exempt public administrator offices from their
purview. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.1(b)(2)(v) (2003).
174 See generally N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT arts. 11, 12 (McKinney 1995). The
Public Administrator has all the powers afforded a fiduciary to manage the affairs
of the estate, including collecting and handling the decedent's assets, liquidating
personal and real property, searching for heirs, preparing tax returns, filing an
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175
City and in the six largest counties outside of New York City,
the public administrator is a distinct public official appointed by
the surrogate; in the remaining counties, the county treasurer
serves as the public administrator. The public administrator
receives a statutory commission based on the size of each estate
administered, and the commission proceeds are remitted to the
76
local government.
In recent years, public administrator offices, particularly
those in New York City, have been sharply criticized for
mismanagement of their responsibilities. 177 Public scrutiny has
focused on the public administrators' counsel, who prepare all
necessary court papers and perform other services on behalf of
the public administrators. 7 8 Unlike the public administrator,
the counsel is not a government employee but a private attorney
who retains his or her legal fees, which are paid from the estates.
Such counsel are often politically-connected lawyers, and their
fees can be quite lucrative, reportedly amounting to hundreds of
79
thousands of dollars per year.1
There are a number of potential alternatives to the current
practice, the most obvious being for the public administrators to
Using public
hire staff attorneys to perform this work.
that
perception
avoid
the
negative
counsel
would
employees as
lucrative estate work is being channeled to favored attorneys
and could save the estates considerable expense. 180 Private

accounting of all transactions for the estate, and ultimately distributing the estate
assets. Id. §§ 1123, 1213.
176 Those counties are Erie, Monroe, Nassau, Onondaga, Suffolk, and
Westchester.
176 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT §§ 1107(1), 1208(1) (McKinney 1995). In a few
upstate counties, the public administrators are authorized to retain their
commissions. See id. § 1207.
177 See, e.g., ROBERT ABRAMS & EDWARD V. REGAN, JOINT REVIEW -BY THE
STATE COMPTROLLER AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATORS (1992).
178 In New York City, the counsel is appointed by the Surrogate. N.Y. SURR. CT.
PROC. ACT § 1108(2)(a) (McKinney 1995). Outside New York City, the public

administrators appoint their own counsel. See id. § 1206(3).
179 See Larry Cohler-Esses, Brooklyn Judge Has Ties to Buddy Making a
Killing on Estates, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 13, 2002, at 8; GraverobbingMade Legal,

N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 14, 2002, at 26; Nancie Katz & Larry Cohler-Esses, Where
There's No Will, There's a Way, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 13, 2002, at 8.

180 As the public administrators are local government, not court, employees,
New York City and the county governments would have to authorize their public

administrators to hire staff attorneys. This would not have to be an added expense
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counsel might still be retained in unusually complex cases, but
that would be the rare exception.
Other alternatives for
consideration would be including the counsel to the public
administrators among the appointees regulated by Part 36which, in particular, would subject them to the new provisions
limiting appointments based on compensation-or promulgating
strict fee schedules for the counsel.
CONCLUSION
The preamble to New York's new fiduciary appointment
rules states that "[public trust in the judicial process demands
that appointments by judges be fair, impartial and beyond
reproach," and that the new rules are designed "to ensure that
appointees are selected on the basis of merit, without favoritism,
nepotism, politics or other factors unrelated to the qualifications
of the appointee or the requirements of the case."18 1 Indeed, the
new rules are a major step forward in addressing long-standing
flaws in the process, and they serve as a model for other judicial
systems around the nation looking to strengthen their fiduciary
appointment procedures.
Scrutiny of fiduciary appointments in New York, however, is
ongoing. The court system's Special Inspector General's Office
has been established as a permanent watchdog, and with easier
access to enhanced information, the press's keen interest in this
subject is sure to continue. Accordingly, time will tell whether
the new rules succeed in resolving the many problems that have
plagued New York's appointment process over the years. If
achievement of the goals set forth in the preamble is thwarted,
adoption of further measures-including those cited in this
Article-may be warranted.

for local governments if the public administrators could charge the estates fees,
albeit much lower fees than currently charged by the private counsel, for the staff
attorneys' services.
181 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.0 (2003).

